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ular event), then they can protect it by way of privacy, and can also exploit it commer-
cially by passing rights to the information to other parties – rights which can be enforced 
through the doctrine of breach of confi dence. In the words of Lord Hoffmann: 33  
Some may view with distaste a world in which information about the events of a wedding… 
should be sold in the market in the same way as information about how to make a better 
mousetrap. But being a celebrity or publishing a celebrity magazine are lawful trades and I 
see no reason why they should be outlawed from such protection as the law of confi dence 
may offer.
Gillian Black
University of Edinburgh
  
The Rights of Relatives to Damages 
(Mesothelioma) (Scotland) Act 2007
The incidence of mesothelioma, a cancer once regarded as rare, is now sometimes 
described as having attained the stage of an epidemic.1 When the UK mesothelioma 
register was established in 1968, 153 deaths were recorded for that year: in 2005, 
a peak of “around 1950-2450 deaths per year some time between 2011 and 2015” 
was estimated.2 The most recent fi gures available now show that annual mortality has 
already entered that range, with 1969 deaths recorded in 2003.3
Two distinctive features of mesothelioma have necessitated special legal responses. 
The fi rst is that the disease has a long latency period, averaging more than 40 years 
from asbestos exposure to diagnosis.4 Recent research across a range of countries has 
indicated that asbestos consumption from 1960 to 1969 was signifi cantly associated 
with mesothelioma deaths occurring from 2000 to 2004.5 In contrast to this lengthy 
latency period, however, survival times for mesothelioma are short, with most deaths 
occurring within fourteen months of diagnosis.6
33 Para 124. 
1 C Pelucchi et al, “The mesothelioma epidemic in Western Europe: an update” (2004) 90 British Journal 
of Cancer 1022.
2 J T Hodgson et al, “The expected burden of mesothelioma mortality in Great Britain from 2002 to 2050” 
(2005) 92 British Journal of Cancer 587 at 591.
3 Health and Safety Executive, Mesothelioma (available at http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/causdis/meso.
htm).
4 C Bianchi et al, “Latency periods in asbestos-related mesothelioma of the pleura” (1997) 6 European 
Journal of Cancer Prevention 162.
5 R-T Lin et al, “Ecological association between asbestos-related diseases and historical asbestos consump-
tion: an international analysis” (2007) 369 Lancet 844.
6 This is the fi gure provided by the Scottish Executive (Scottish Executive, Amendment to Section 1(2) 
of the Damages (Scotland) Act 1976: Consultation Paper (2006) para 1.1). No source is given for this 
fi gure, but it is consistent with the medical literature: see, e.g. J Peto et al, “Continuing increase in 
mesothelioma mortality in Britain” (1995) 345 Lancet 535. 
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Those factors have problematic consequences. Because of the latency period, a 
pursuer who has developed mesothelioma may have been exposed to asbestos from 
a number of different sources, most obviously where he has had a number of jobs 
involving such exposure. Where that is the case, there will be no way of establishing 
which of these exposures caused the mesothelioma. That issue has been addressed by 
the House of Lords twice, fi rstly in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd7 and 
thereafter in Barker v Corus (UK) plc.8
In Fairchild, departing from normal principles of causation, it was held that such a 
claimant could bring an action against any potential defendant who had exposed him 
to asbestos. The benefi t of this decision to pursuers was, however, signifi cantly limited 
by the decision in Barker, where it was held that the claimant could only recover 
damages in respect of that particular defendant’s contribution to the risk. Here, the 
latency period has a further signifi cant consequence: many of the potential defendants 
in the three appeals heard together in Barker were insolvent and uninsured by the 
time the cases reached court.
The decision in Barker (from which Lord Rodger of Earlsferry dissented) was 
regarded as controversial and was promptly reversed by Parliament in the Compensa-
tion Act 2006.9 Under section 3 of the 2006 Act, a responsible person in a mesothe-
lioma case10 is liable jointly and severally with any other responsible person. This 
does not, however, prevent one responsible person from claiming a contribution from 
another, or a fi nding of contributory negligence.
A. THE PRESENT PROBLEM
Fairchild and the Compensation Act 2006 do not, however, solve all the problems 
attendant on a claim for damages in a mesothelioma case. The background to the 
specifi c problem which the Rights of Relatives to Damages (Mesothelioma) (Scotland) 
Act 2007 addresses is as follows.
Historically, a claim for solatium was regarded as personal in nature, and so could 
be made only by the injured person and not by an executor acting in his place.11 That 
rule gave rise to a concern that it might encourage defenders to prolong proceedings 
where a pursuer was terminally ill,12 and so the rule was modifi ed in 1993. Now, the 
right to solatium unconditionally transmits to the executor.13
Relatives of a deceased person may also be entitled to claim delictual damages on 
7 [2003] 1 AC 32.
8 [2006] 2 AC 572. On the two cases, see J Thomson, “Barker v Corus: Fairchild chickens come home to 
roost” (2006) 10 Edin LR 421; M Hogg, “Re-establishing orthodoxy in the realm of causation” (2007) 
11 Edin LR 8.
9 The Scottish Executive supported this change and a Sewel motion was passed consenting to the UK 
Parliament legislating on the point. See M Earle, The Rights of Relatives to Damages (Mesothelioma) 
(Scotland) Bill (SPICe Briefi ng 06/94, 2006) 20-21.
10 For the precise defi nition of cases covered by the section, see s 3(1).
11 Damages (Scotland) Act 1976 s 2. Prior to the 1976 Act, the rule was subject to a limited exception where 
an executor was continuing proceedings which had been initiated by an injured person before his death: 
Neilson v Rodger (1853) 16 D 325; Bern’s Exr v Montrose Asylum (1893) 20 R 859.
12 Scottish Law Commission, Report on the Effect of Death on Damages (Scot Law Com No 134, 1992).
13 Damages (Scotland) Act 1993 s 3.
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their own account for what can conveniently be termed “loss of society”.14 This statu-
tory right is akin to solatium (and replaces the common law right to solatium which 
such relatives could formerly assert).15 However, if liability is excluded or discharged 
prior to the injured party’s death, no claim for loss of society could – prior to the 2007 
Act – be made after their death.16
Consequently, where a pursuer was suffering from mesothelioma, the value of “his” 
claim might have increased substantially if he were to forego pursuing it during his 
lifetime, leaving it up to his relatives to do so after his death. Although this problem is 
exacerbated by the transmissibility of solatium, it could occur regardless of this, partic-
ularly in a case where multiple persons fell within the category of relatives entitled to 
seek damages for loss of society.17 That diffi culty was further exacerbated by the fact 
that damages for loss of society are now signifi cantly greater than they have been in 
the past,18 and also by recent Court of Session reforms having increased the likelihood 
of an action for damages in a mesothelioma case being concluded within the pursuer’s 
lifetime.19
In principle, this diffi culty might have arisen in any case where an actionable wrong 
had shortened a pursuer’s life expectancy. However, pursuers are unlikely to forego 
claiming damages for lengthy periods (and procedural bars such as limitation may 
make such a choice impossible). Because, however, survival times for mesothelioma 
are typically so short, pursuers were often faced with a tragic choice: in order to 
maximise the fi nancial benefi t to their family, should they avoid seeking compensation 
– with all the hardship that may entail – during their lifetime?
B. THE 2007 ACT
The solution offered to this dilemma by the Rights of Relatives to Damages 
(Mesothelioma) (Scotland) Act 2007 is a straightforward one. It creates an excep-
tion to the principle that damages for loss of society are unavailable where liability to 
the deceased has been excluded or discharged before his death.20 That exception is 
limited to cases where “the personal injury in consequence of which the deceased died 
14 Damages (Scotland) Act 1976 s 1(4), as amended by the Damages (Scotland) Act 1993 (where the term 
“loss of society” was replaced with a more detailed enumeration of the matters for which the relative can 
seek compensation). Only members of the deceased’s “immediate family” can claim such damages: for 
the defi nition of this term, see s 10(2) and Sch 1 of the 1976 Act, as amended by s 35(3) of the Family 
Law (Scotland) Act 2006.
15 The common law right is excluded by s 1(7) of the Damages (Scotland) Act 1976.
16 Damages (Scotland) Act 1976 s 1(2).
17 In evidence to the Justice 1 Committee, Phyllis Craig of Clydeside Action on Asbestos referred to a case 
where a woman with an “asbestos-related condition” had nine children and a husband, which, it was 
estimated, meant that a claim in delict would increase in value by £118,000 if pursued after her death 
rather than before. Scottish Parliament, Offi cial Report, Justice 1 Committee, col 4112 (6 Dec 2006).
18 This follows the recognition in Shaher v British Aerospace Flying College Ltd 2003 SC 540 and McLean 
v William Denny & Bros Ltd 2004 SC 656 that judicial awards for loss of society in recent years had been 
too low.
19 Justice 1 Committee, Stage 1 Report on the Rights of Relatives to Damages (Mesothelioma) (Scotland) 
Bill (1st Report, 2007) para 11.
20 Damages (Scotland) Act 1976 s 1(2). The 2007 Act inserts new subsections (2A) and (2B) into s 1 of the 
1976 Act.
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is mesothelioma”, and both the death and a discharge of liability occurred on or after 
20 December 2006.21 In such cases, relatives may claim damages for loss of society 
after the pursuer’s death despite the earlier discharge of liability.
How does this sit with the existing law of damages? It runs counter to what might be 
termed the “once and for all” principle – that is, that damages for all losses arising from 
a delict must be claimed and recovered in the one action.22 That principle, however, is 
far from an absolute one,23 and has for some time been subject to an exception in cases 
where an award of provisional damages is made under section 12 of the Administra-
tion of Justice Act 1982.
While there is a clear public interest in not leaving defenders with a future potential 
claim hanging over them indefi nitely,24 the consequences of the 2007 Act are no more 
onerous for defenders than those which might already obtain as a result of an award 
of provisional damages. Although the 2007 Act leaves the potential future liability 
open indefi nitely, in contrast to an award of provisional damages which will normally 
place a time limit on subsequent awards,25 the generally short survival times associated 
with mesothelioma mean that this distinction is without difference.26 In any event, the 
problem – if a problem it is – may be more theoretical than real, as it will frequently 
be possible to deal with both the original pursuer’s and the relatives’ subsequent claim 
by means of a single court action.27
Purists may be disappointed that the problem has been solved by means of ad 
hoc, mesothelioma-specifi c legislation, rather than by any reformulation of principle. 
Originally, the Executive had expressed an intention to give Scottish Ministers the 
“power to extend the new provision to apply to other diseases or kinds of personal 
injury if experience shows this to be necessary”,28 but resiled from this view after the 
conclusion of the consultation process, citing the unique characteristics of mesothe-
lioma.29
Such an ad hoc approach has its advantages, particularly insofar as it allows the 
consequences of the legislation to be quantifi ed with relative precision in advance, 
and (hopefully) avoids unanticipated consequences of the type which, as a result of 
earlier legislative reforms, may have contributed to the present problem in the fi rst 
place.30 But it also runs the risk of unfairly discriminating against pursuers suffering 
21 The Executive originally proposed that the exception would only apply from the date on which the Act 
received royal assent, but amended its position when it became clear that some degree of retrospectivity 
would be desirable and would not meet with objections from insurers: see Justice 1 Committee, Stage 
1 Report (n 19) paras 71-79.
22 See Potter v McCulloch 1987 SLT 308 at 310 per Lord Weir.
23 It is perhaps less strictly applicable outside of personal injury cases: see Duke of Abercorn v Merry & 
Cunninghame 1909 SC 750.
24 See Paterson v Costain Mining Co 1988 SLT 413 at 414 per Lord Davidson.
25 Bonar v Trafalgar House Offshore Fabrication Ltd 1996 SLT 548 at 551 per Lord Gill.
26 Particularly as the onset of a fatal disease within an unpredictable timescale was held to justify a provi-
sional award without limit of time in Patterson v Ministry of Defence [1987] CLY 1194.
27 See Dow v West of Scotland Shipbreaking Company Ltd [2007] CSOH 71.
28 Scottish Executive, Consultation Paper (n 6) para 3.17.
29 Rights of Relatives to Damages (Mesothelioma) (Scotland) Bill: Policy Memorandum (SP Bill 75-PM, 
2006) paras 13-16.
30 As the Executive has acknowledged: Policy Memorandum (n 29) para 17.
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similar dilemmas as a result of different forms of personal injury. It is, therefore, to 
be welcomed that at the same time as proposing this legislation, the Scottish Minis-
ters referred the general question of damages for wrongful death to the Scottish Law 
Commission, thus providing an opportunity for the law in this area to be rationalised.
James Chalmers
University of Edinburgh
The author wishes to acknowledge the comments of Dr Fiona Leverick on an earlier 
draft, and the support of Queen Mary, University of London, where he was based as a 
visiting research fellow at the time when this note was written.
By the Book: Enrichment by Interference
HarperCollins Publishers Ltd v Young1 is an example of a rarity: a case on corporeal 
moveables in the Court of Session.2 The pursuer, the well-known publisher, operates 
a distribution centre in Glasgow. There it receives books returned from retailers. It 
pulps the paperbacks, but outsources the pulping of hardbacks and audio books to 
another company, Stirling Fibre Ltd. The pursuer averred that various of its products, 
which were wrapped in cellophane, had “gone missing”3 from the centre or in transit 
to that company. It further averred that the defender, during a fi ve-year period, had 
listed for sale 14,083 products published by the pursuer on the internet site ebay and 
had sold 9,365. The defender was said to have made £61,351.57 from these sales. The 
pursuer averred that it had no commercial relationship with the defender and that the 
books that he marketed were those items which had gone missing. It sought a whole 
battery of remedies, including redelivery of the books and payment of the profi t made 
by selling them. The case came before Lady Clark of Calton in the Outer House for 
a debate.
A. PROVING OWNERSHIP
The pursuer faced an uphill battle as to proving the books were its property. It averred 
that due to the scale of its operation at the distribution centre it was “not possible … 
to ascertain exactly when or how the items went missing”.4 About 120 million books 
were distributed from there every year. The defender argued that there was no proper 
link between the books which had allegedly disappeared and those sold or held by the 
defender. The pursuer contended, however, that the low prices at which the defender 
marketed the goods made it impossible for him to have obtained them legitimately. 
1 [2007] CSOH 65.
2 For another example, see Boskabelle Ltd v Laird [2006] CSOH 173, 2006 SLT 1079, discussed in D L 
Carey Miller, “Right to annual crops” (2007) 11 EdinLR 274.
3 [2007] CSOH 65 at para 4.
4 Para 7.
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